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--Providing for the common defense.. has been a goal of the United States
since its founding.' The federal government and Congress, as charged with the duty
to protect the citizens of the United States, has the constitutional authority to do all
things that are --necessary and proper.. to carTy out their legislative duties.2 The
Executi ve is charged with the duty to --faithfully execute the Office of President;· and
--preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the Un ited States of Arnerica:· 3 The
development of new technologies over the nati on· s history has expanded the
definition of what it takes to secure the homeland and provide for the common
defense. The mobility of citizens from all over the world through air travel and the
international shipping of goods by air freight and ports present the United States with
new challenges in protecting both citizens and infrastructure. The events of

1

U. S. Constitution. Preamble.
U.S. Constitution. art. I. sec. 8.
1
U.. Constitulion. art. 2. sec. I.

2

September 11 th changed the way American policy makers conceive of the security
environment within the United States. The "War on Terror" has no end in sight.
The tools needed to secure the nation's ports and airways have become
increasingly more complex. According to Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of
Homeland Security, the growing interconnectedness between countries has the
potential to raise the level of prosperity for people around the world, but with it
comes leverage for terrorists and transnational criminals. 4 Chertoff stated, "The
ocean is no longer a protective device; the twenty-first century has made these
obstacles very small. " 5 Both maritime and aviation security are now more
demanding than ever. However, there is much debate about whether the restructured
aviation and maritime security measures are living up to their ilew demands.
After the terrorist attacks of9/l l, both aviation and maritime homeland
security were restructured and placed within the Department of Homeland Security.
Maritime homeland security evolved from a program formerly know as Port Security
which corresponded to the Cold War effort to secure U.S. ports and port facilities
from threats presented by the Soviet bloc. 6 The revised Maritime Homeland Security
program is focused almost solely on the prevention of terrorist attacks. 7 The federal
takeover of the former private aviation security sector in the aftermath of9/l l

4

Mary Kate Nevin, "Global Futures, Global Risks," World Policy Journal, (Sept. 2009),
http://www.creativeleadershipsummit.org/?g~node/730.
5
Ibid.
6
Robert F. Bennett, "Close the Gaps," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 133, (Aug. 2007): 42-46.
http://www.ebscohost.com
7
Ibid.

resulted in the creation of the Transportation Security Administration. 8 Security
procedures formerly controlled by the Federal Aviation Administration and
Transportation Security Administration are now located within the Department of
Homeland Security. 9 These structural changes were part of the "most complicated
restructuring of the federal government ever proposed," according to Donald F.
Kettl.

10

This was an attempt to combine the expertise that already existed within the

federal government that was highly fragmented and compartmentalized. 11
This study is a comparative case study with a qualitative content analysis. A
comparative case study is a type of cumulative study that serves as a cross unit
comparison that attempts to discover generalizations about commonalities reflecting a
policy, process, program, or decision. 12 In order to provide an evaluation of current
aviation and maritime security, its' constitutional foundations and organizational
structures have been examined. To determine their constitutional foundations,
executive orders, court rulings, and precedents were used to secure an understanding.
Also, the employees, cost factors, and reporting lines have been used to examine the
organizational structure and culture.
Though major improvements have been made to security procedures within
the United States, some major problems still exist. Also, I would argue that many of

8

Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics (Washington, D.C.:
CQ Press, 2007), 49.
9
lbid., 50.
10
Ibid., 53.
11
Ibid., 39.
12
Jason L. Jensen and Robert Rodgers, "Cumulating the Intellectual Gold of Case Study Research,"
Public Administration Review 61 (Mar.-Apr. 2001): 238. http://www.jstor.com.

the security procedures have the impact of limi ting the civil liberties of American
citizen instead of citizens of the world. Accord ing to Douglas J. Feith. to prevent
another attack, U.S. policy can either ..change the way we li ve" or ··change the way
they li ve:·

13

History how that during ti me of war it is possible for the rights of

American citi zens to be limited by the government, sometimes unnecessarily;
Americans would be better served by efforts that reduce the rights of fo reign citizens
where infringement is nece ary. For example. during the Civil War. President
Lincoln suspended the writ o_(habeas c01pus despite objections from the Supreme
Court.

14

Finally, the current organizational structure of the Depa1tment of Homeland

Security ha not had the ucces that was intended. though some substantial progress
has been realized.
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INTRODUCTION

The increasing threat of terrorism within the United States has made it
necessary to change the way the federal government looks at and deals with security
issues. The threat of terrorism that emerged with the attacks of September 11, 200 I is
a "new war without national borders and without lines of battle." 1
The "fear that terrorists may get hold of nuclear and biological weapons is not
unfounded, and this has induced even states under the rule of law to have
recourse to internal systems of security similar to those that once existed only
in dictatorships; and yet, the feeling remains that all these precautions will
never real! be enough; since a completely global control is neither possible or
desirable."

1

In an attempt to be proactive in preventing future terrorist attacks, Congress
reorganized the nation's security apparatus. 3

This restructuring resulted in the

creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is the largest agency
in existence. 4 DHS is an executive agency with secretary structure as follows:

'Joseph Ratzinger, "Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures," San Francisco: Ignatius Press (2006): 2525.
2
Ibid., 26.
3
There may be parallel organizational changes associated with previous wars and conflicts. These are
beyond the scope of this research, but they merit further research.
4
Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics (Washington, D.C.:
CQ Press, 2007), 55-120.

1

Figure 1: Department of Homeland Security Organizational Structure5
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outlines the agencies included within the Department of Homeland Security.
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Table 1: DHS: What's in the Agency? 6
Border & Transportation Security
• U.S. Customs Service
• Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services
• Federal Protective Service
• Transportation Security Administration
• Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
• Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service
• Office for Domestic Preoaredness
Emergency Preparedness & Response
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Strategic National Stockpile & the National Disaster Medical System
Nuclear Incident Response Team
Domestic Emergency Support Teams
• National Domestic Preparedness Office
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
• Critical Infrastructures Office
• Federal Computer Incident Response Center
• National Communications System
• National Infrastructure Protection Center
• Energv Security and Assurance Program
Science and Technology
• Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Countermeasures Program
Environmental Measures Laboratory
• National Biological Warfare Defense Analysis Center
• Plum Island Animal Disease Center
Citizenship and Immigration Services
• Bureau ofCitizenshio and Immigration Services
Coast Guard
Secret Service

•
•
•
•

•

The new Department of Homeland Security encompasses twenty-one already existing
agencies; it includes five border patrol and transportation security departments, the
Coast Guard, the Secret Service, citizenship and immigration services, and
infrastructure protection.

However, many agencies and departments were not

included within the structure of DHS. The three leading U.S. intelligence agencies-

6

Kettl, "System Under Stress," 55-120.

3

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)-were not included in the new department,
despite the fact that homeland security depends on the intelligence collected from
these agencies. 7
Two key agencies that were included in the new department after the
reorganization are the Transportation Security Administration and Customs and
Border Protection which are both responsible for securing and facilitating the nation's
legitimate trade and travel from terrorist infiltration. The Transportation Security
Administration is responsible for aviation security and Customs and Border
Protection is responsible for maritime security measures. This thesis will examine the
historical development of each agency and policy changes since 9/11; provide a
comparative analysis of the two agencies and their common administrative
challenges; and offer recommendations for further study and policy adoption.

7

Ibid.

4

MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY
Maritime Homeland Security evolved from a program formerly known as Port
Security. Port security was first recognized as a national priority during World War I
era when a series of explosions ripped through the waterfront at Black Tom Island in
New Jersey on July 30, 1916.8 Later, the Port Security program "represented the
Cold War effort to secure U.S. ports and port facilities from the Soviet bloc." 9 The
revised Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) program is focused almost solely on the
prevention of terrorist attacks. 10 The challenge of securing U.S. Ports is vast.
Consider the following statistics: 11
•
•
•
•

90% of the world's cargo moves by ship
More than 11 million containers are offloaded at U.S. Ports every year
Almost half of the incoming U.S. trade arrives by ship
The U.S. has 361 seaports

Three hundred and sixty one ports and 11 million containers constitute no small task.
Of the 11 million containers that enter the country each year only about two-thirds
were screened for radiological material as of 2006. 12 However, cargo containers are
not the only threat to the security of U.S. ports. Captain Robert Bennett of the U.S.
Coast Guard notes that focusing solely on cargo is a mistake since several other

8

Dennis L. Bryant, "Port Security: A Historical Perspective," Mari11eli11k.com, March 8, 2004,
http://www.marinelink.com/News/Article/Column-Port-Security-A-HistoricalPerspective/323403.aspxf.
9
Robert F. Bennett, "Close the Gaps," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 133, (Aug. 2007): 42-46.
http://www.ebscohost.com
10
Ibid.
11
Captain Ashley, "Container and Port Security: A Bilateral Perspective," The Illlernational Journal of
Marine and Costa/ Law, (2003): 341-361. http://www.ebscohost.com.
12
"US Port Security Act Becomes Law," Oil Spill Intelligence Repon 29 (2006): 48-50.
http://www.ebscohost.com.

5

•

problems exist.

13

The division of responsibilities regarding MHS is also a potential

problem due to a lack of communication between government agencies.

The

agencies charged with the key maritime security responsibilities are The Department
of Homeland security (DHS), U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
and the Transportation Security Administration. 14 An attack on a major U.S. port
could cause economic mayhem as well as mass death and infrastructure damage.
Since 9/11, steps have been taken in order to combat the potential security
weaknesses of U.S. ports. The two leading steps are the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) and the SAFE Port Act. 15 This chapter will examine the
importance of maritime homeland security policy and changes since 9/11.
Maritime Homeland Security was created as a response to the horrific attacks
of September 11, 2001 in order to prevent a future attack of the same magnitude from
occurring through the cargo containers shipped into the U.S. daily. Robert Bennett
notes that "experts cite our abundant economy as one reason why the enemy hates us.
Therefore, it must be protected. In view of their importance to our economy, our
merchant marine partners in world commerce must not be viewed as criminals." 16
Bennett makes a valid point in the respect that the U.S. economy is a target of
terrorists-evident in their attack on the World Trade Centers, but it would not seem
that it is a reason our enemies hate us. The enemies of the U.S. attacked the World
13

Bennett, "Close the Gaps," 42-46.
Stephen Caldwell, The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implememation One Year Later (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007). http://www.ebscohost.com.
15
Ibid.
16
Bennett, "Close the Gaps," 42-46.
14

6

Trade Centers as a symbolic act. Economic targets are relevant to the terrorists
because they are important to Americans and cause physical destruction and financial
mayhem, which are a terrorist's goal. Terrorists do not wish to occupy land, but
instead to violently disrupt the lives of Americans by causing panic and fear. Since
the shipping industry contributes to so much of the United States and world economy,
an attack would hold similar strategic importance with that of the World Trade
Centers. As a maritime attack is plausible, this is a very pertinent area of policy
research.
The key agency charged with the protection of America's borders from
terrorism is the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Customs and
Border Protection is located within the Department of Homeland Security and is
charged with the duty to "protect our nation's borders from terrorism, human and
drug smuggling, illegal ntigration, and agricultural pests while simultaneously
facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade." 17

CBP is responsible for

guarding 7,000 ntiles of land border shared with Canada and Mexico, 2,000 miles of
coastal waters around the Florida peninsula and Southern California, and 95,000
ntiles of maritime border in partnership with the U.S. Coast Guard. 18 The agency

17

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ''This is CBP,"
http://cbp.gov/xp/gov/about/mission/cbp is.xml (accessed March 26, 20IO).
18
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ''This is CBP," Border Security,
http://cbp.2ov/xp/gov/about/mission/cbp is.xml (accessed March 26, 20IO).

7

must process all people, vehicles, and cargo entering the U.S. while carrying out its
priority anti-terrorism mission. 19 The following chart outlines the structure of CBP.
Figure 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Organizational Structure20
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For the first time in United States history, a single agency is responsible for border
protection.

21

CBP is the "unified border agency" within DHS; it combined U.S.

Customs, U.S. Immigration, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and the
entire U.S. Border Patrol. 22 Customs and Border Protection contains more than

19

Ibid.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Organization,"
hllp://cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/organization/orgchal .ctt/orgchal .pdf (accessed April 5, 2010).
21
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Protecting Our Borders Against Terrorism,"
hltp://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/cbp.xml (accessed March 26, 2010).
22
Ibid.
20
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41,000 employees to "manage, control and protect the Nation's borders, at and
between the official ports of entry. 23
The threat to U.S. ports is real and the flaws in protection are endless. First,
the intense focus on the specific port areas and not our entire coastline could be
questioned.

Secondly, despite the layers of security implemented for container

shipments, ignoring other areas of security other than the container shipments is an
extreme flaw leaving large gaps in security efforts. Other areas of concentration
should be on mine warfare, threats from small seagoing vessels, and identifying
private terminals of enemy interest. 24 Mine warfare is a substantial threat. An Iraqi
mine laying operation that used a commercial seagoing tug and barge discovered by
allied forces during the early stages of the Iraq War could be replicated along U.S.
coastline.

25

The threat of small seagoing vessels is another important area of focus

since small vessels are not subjected to the same notification and identification
regulations as large ships. They pose the same level of threat because a weapon of
mass destruction will fit onto a 60 foot boat as easily as a shipping container. 26 Also,
small vessels are not required to dock at the larger ports; they have the ability to
navigate into much smaller coastal inlets and estuaries. 27 Finally, a lack of focus on
privately-owned terminals is a great threat. Private terminals often include chemical
and petroleum waterfront facilities associated with bulk distribution which might be a
23

Ibid.
Bennett, "Close the Gaps," 42-46.
25
Ibid., 42-46.
2
Toid., 42-46.
27
lbid., 42-46.
24

9

more fertile terrorist target than containerships filled with watertight steel boxes
secured at state docks. 28 Private sector terminals pose a threat to U.S. security,
therefore, they should be afforded the same level of security as public facilities.
According to Robert Bennett, our national policy is treating the war on
terrorism as a law enforcement effort rather than a military campaign. 29 Instead of
treating the enemy as a perpetrator that we will catch after a crime is committed, we
should see them as non-uniformed combatants. Since law enforcement operations are
reactive, prevention of a terrorist attack becomes much more difficult. Therefore, it is
essential to pursue maritime security as a military operation, which tends to be a
proactive measure that would neutralize the enemy before a terrorist act is committed.
Weaknesses in port security are being dealt with through the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the SAFE Port Act. 30

The Maritime

Transportation Security Act amended the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (MMA). 31
The MMA was signed by President Roosevelt on June 30, 1936.32 It was created to
"[t]o further the development and maintenance of an adequate and well-balanced
American merchant marine, to promote the commerce of the United States, and to aid
in the national defense." 33 This Act created the United States Maritime Commission
transferring "[a]Il the functions, powers, and duties vested in the former United States
28

1bid., 42-46.
""Ibid., 42-46.
3
°Caldwell, The SAFE Port Act.
31
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 107th Cong. S. 1214. 25 Nov. 2002.
<http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/MTSA.pdf>.
32
Ralph L. Dewey, "The Merchant Marine Act of 1936," American Economic Review 27, (June 1937):
240. http://www.jstor.org.
33
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, U.S. Code, vol. 27, sec. 101-907 (1936).

Shipping Board by the Shipping Act, 1916, the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, the
Merchant Marine Act, 1928, the Intracoastal Shipping Act, 1933, and amendments to
those Acts," and that was then "vested in the Department of Commerce pursuant to
section 12 of the President's Executive order of June 10, I 933," to the Commission. 34
The MTSA was enacted in November of 2002 to help protect ports and waterways
from terrorist attacks by requiring a wide range of security improvements. 35 Major
requirements included in the MTSA are the development of security plans to mitigate
identified risks for the national maritime system, conducting vulnerability
assessments for port facilities and vessels, establishing a process to assess foreign
ports, and the development of the Worker Identification Credential. 36
The SAFE Port Act, enacted in October 2006, made several adjustments to
programs within the port security framework, created and codified new programs and
initiatives, and amended some of the original provisions of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act. 37 The SAFE Port Act contains three key areas: overall
port security; security at individual facilities; and cargo container security. 38 Each of
the three key areas contains several security programs. The key areas and programs
are outlined below in Table 2. The programs marked with an asterisk are the most
important with regard to securing United States ports and vessels from the risk of a
terrorist attack.
34

Ibid., sec. 204(a).
Caldwell, The SAFE Port Act.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
3s Ibid.
35
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Table 2: Summaryof3K ey A reas an d 19Programs ofSAFEPort A ct39
PROGRAM

DESCRIPTION

Overall Port Security
Area Maritime Security Committees

Committees of port stakeholders who share info
& develoo securitv olans
Command centers where agencies share
information, coordinate activities and joint
efforts
Activities to maintain security and deter attacks
(boat oatrols)
Plan laying out local port vulnerabilities,
response actions and responsibilities
Test the effectiveness of port security plans
Coast Guard program where officers visit and
assess securitv conditions at foreign oorts.

Interagency Operational Centers

*Port Security operations

*Area Maritime Security Plans
Port Security Exercises
*Evaluations of security at foreign ports

Port Facility Security
*Port facility security plans

Include

operational

and

physical

security

measures and procedures for responding to
security threat
Coast Guard review of port facility security
plans and compliance
Biometric ID cards to be issued to port workers
to help secure access to areas of ports
OHS requirements for persons who enter secure
or restricted areas or transoort hazardous cargo

*Port facility security compliance monitoring
*Transportation Worker Identification Credential
*Background Checks

Container Security
*Automated Targeting System

Risk-based decision system to determine
containers reouiring inspection
Allows goods to transit the U.S. without
entering U.S. commerce
CPB officers at foreign ports to inspect high
risk carJ>.o before it comes to U.S.
Partnership of CPB and private companies to
imorove int'l securitv
Goal to standardize supply chain security
Radiation detection technology at foreign ports
to stoo oroliferation of WMD
ContainerSecurity Initiative scanning combined
with Megaports Initiative at forei!!II ports
Scanning by nonintrusive imaging and radiation
detection equipment of all cargo containers at
foreign oorts inbound to the U.S. bv 2012
Research, development, testing,& evaluation of
radiation detection equipment to prevent
nuclear or radiological materials from entering
the U.S.

Customs In-Bond System
*Container Security Initiative
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
Promoting Global Standards
*Megaports Initiative
*Secure Freight Initiative
* 100 Percent Container Scanning at Foreign Ports

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
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The programs of the SAFE Port Act are extensive, but limited in scope; most
of the programs are focused on the threats of cargo containers and the immediate
public port area. The most substantial program is the 100% Container Scanning at
Foreign Ports by the year 2012. This is a beneficial way to be proactive against
terrorism instead of waiting until a weapon of mass destruction is docked at a U.S.
port.
Maritime Homeland Security, formerly known as Port Security, is a daunting
task. Though great strides have been made in areas relating to public port security
and cargo container inspection, many weaknesses still exist. An attack could be
orchestrated using smaller vessels not regulated by the SAFE Port Act or mines
placed near ports. Maritime threats will continue as long as a significant portion of
all U.S. trade arrives by ship. Eleven million containers, originating from 700 global
ports, enter the U.S. at 361 different port locations within the U.S. Despite this,
container security should not be the sole focus of maritime homeland security. The
best way to deal with this threat is to be proactive by scanning all containers before
they arrive on U.S. soil and focusing on the less visible weaknesses. This will help to
ensure a Weapon of Mass Destruction is not detonated at a major United States port,
which will generally be near a major city where the devastation to the city and its
economy would be immense. According to Warren Rudman, Senator and co-chair of
the U.S. Commission on National Security, perhaps the biggest failure of the
Department of Homeland Security is the lack of progress in shoring up ports and it is

13

still the #1 unsolved problem. 40 In sum, a significant amount of progress has been
made toward improving maritime security, but the changes are not currently sufficient
to guard against acts of terrorism while gaps in security procedures exist.

~erry Kivlan, "Rudman Decries Department as 'Mess,' Urges Reorganization,'' CongressDaily AM,
December 4, 2007, http://www.ebscohost.com.
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AVIA TION HOMELAND SECURITY
The aviation industry within the United States has proliferated since World War I
when surplus aircrafts were converted for civilian commercial use. 41 Air travel has
become one of the most common forms of transportation due to its expediency.
Passenger air traffic grew from 172 million in 1970 to nearly 642 million in a little
over 30 years. 42

With its enormous popularity and a primary means of public

transportation thousands of people jam a terminal on any given day, presenting a
particularly enticing target for terrorists. Airports are especially appealing because
they are filled with people each and every day; move on a scheduled basis in
predictable geographic locations; and are public facilities. 43

According to Eben

Kaplan, writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, "[t]here is a particular horror
attached to transportation attacks because passengers are in effect helpless in a
situation like that. In addition, the dramatic nature of airliner attacks attracts a vast
amount of media attention and can help inspire fear in the populace-two major aims
of most terrorist operations."44

The challenge in providing adequate physical,

personnel, and operational security is substantial and should not be neglected. 45 The
types of potential threats are numerous. It can emanate from a terminal assault, a

41
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hijacking, and the use of an aircraft as a weapon.46 The attacks of September 11,
2001 are not the only instance of airline attacks to consider. As early as 1970,
Palestinian terrorists hijacked several airliners forcing them to fly to the Jordanian
desert and the aircrafts were destroyed in a fiery explosion. 47

In 1985, fanatic

Japanese terrorists, in support of the Palestinian cause, opened fire on airline
passengers at the Vienna and Rome airports. 48

As recently as 2002, a former

Egyptian citizen living in California opened fire on passengers waiting in line at the
El Al check-in counter.

49

The continued use of airlines as a source of terrorist attacks

demonstrates the need for heightened security measures in U.S. airports and airports
around the world. Aviation security is a vital component of the United States' desire
for complete defenses against terrorist attacks.

This chapter will examine the

important issues of aviation security and the laws and regulations being implemented.
Transportation Security Administration policies are numerous and diverse, covering
multiple levels of security, and are comprehensively more effective than critics
suggest, despite some needed improvements.
The development of new technologies throughout the nation's history has
expanded the definition of what it takes to secure the homeland and provide for the
common defense. The mobility of citizens from all over the world through air travel
has presented the United States with new challenges in protecting both citizens and

46
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infrastructure. Aviation security is an important part of the federal government's
attempt to protect and defend the homeland. Aviation security has been changed
drastically in our recent history, but it is unclear if the advances in security measures
have been sufficient in reducing criminal and terrorist aviation threats. According to
the literature, despite advances in aviation security, major downfalls still exist.
Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, airport security was governed by federal
regulations that were implemented by private companies hired by individual
airports. 50 In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration proposed that
stricter security measures be implemented, but that the airport security companies
would remain privatized. 51 However, the Senate had a different idea. They thought
that only a federal takeover of aviation security and personnel would eliminate the
existing problems with the private system and reestablish citizen confidence in the
aviation industry. 52
The resulting legislation created the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), located within the Department of Transportation, which was charged with the
duty to hire airport screeners and enhance airline security. 53

Even after the

transportation security bill was passed, Democrats in Congress continued to argue for
a full-scale department of homeland security. 54

The Bush Administration later

proposed that twenty-two federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities be
50
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combined into a single new department, with secretary structure, and a budget that is
subject to congressional approval. 55 The TSA was included as a part of the new
Department of Homeland Security, while the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
remained part of the Department of Transportation. 56
The TSA is responsible for the security of all of the nation's transportation
systems and for ensuring the freedom of movement for people and commerce. 57 Gale
Rossides is the current Acting Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration and there are sixteen assistant administrators that work within specific
sectors of TSA duties. 58 The TSA employs several types of officials in order to
perform their required functions: 59
•
•
•
•
•
•

Transportation Security Officers
Federal Air Marshals
Bomb Assessment Officers
Intelligence Analysts
Federal Flight Deck Officers
Canine Explosive Detection Teams

The TSA also provides several security training programs to non-TSA employees in
order to enhance the security and safety of all air travelers. One of the main programs
falling within this category is training for all law enforcement officers who would like

55
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to remain armed while flying. 60 This is a mandatory program under Code of Federal
Regulations 1544.219 which dictates the Carriage of Accessible Weapons. 61
The changes implemented since 9/11 are not sufficient according to some
commentators. "Don't Sweat the TSA," was recently published by Fred Reed where
he argues that there are several problems with security implemented by the TSA. 62
He states that it is a problem that baggage is not inspected until it is already inside a
crowded terminal; a busy airport is as good a target as a plane. 63 This is an often
overlooked point. Anyone who has flown in the last few years can recognize this
often overlooked gap in security. Also, it is widely know that if you buy a one way
ticket you will be questioned by TSA security officers; however, it seems likely that
any terrorist would then buy a roundtrip ticket in order to avoid being questioned. 64
More security downfalls were pointed out by Nicholas Stein in his article called
"America's Time Bomb".

According to Stein, "our nation's airport-security

apparatus still suffers from the same weaknesses it did before the Twin Towers were
toppled."65 He lists several reasons for support: 66
I. Current screening methods cannot locate improvised explosive devices
2. Outdated screening technology
60
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Chronic staff shortages
Insufficient training for TSA screeners
Sensitive areas are not secure
No after-hours security
No accountability
Institutional TSA Cover-ups

It is evident that critics of TSA policies and procedures have found several defects;
however, the TSA seems confident in their abilities to protect the nation's airports.
Further criticisms have been made by Gregory D. Kutz and John W. Cooney
in their article "Aviation Security Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert Testing of
TSA's Passenger Screening Process." 67

They stated that GAO investigators

succeeded in passing through TSA security screening checkpoints undetected with
components for several improvised explosive devices concealed in their carry-on
luggage and on their persons. 68 However, it could be argued that these investigators
know the detection systems better than a terrorist, making it easier for them to avoid
detection. The system is, nevertheless, flawed in some fashion if these investigators
can breach the security system undetected. The security checkpoints will be flawless
when investigators who know the system cannot pass through undetected. Criticisms
from Eben Kaplan state that focusing so heavily on passenger screening has left
aircraft vulnerability in other areas, such as cargo security. 69 TSA programs are
continually updated and many of these security issues are being resolved. Though
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critics of TSA policies are abundant, the TSA urges that covert testing of passenger
screening is helping to alleviate many of the weaknesses. 70
While information regarding the development of aviation security is abundant,
the literature is lacking in the quantity of evaluative studies measuring the success of
current policies and procedures implemented by the TSA.

The change in

enforcement from the Federal Aviation Administration to the Transportation Security
Administration was intended to improve security for citizens of the United States, but
the literature is unclear regarding the effectiveness of the new department. It is also
unclear what changes could potentially arise under the new Democratic Obama
Administration, since he has currently failed to make any significant changes to TSA
policies.
Current aviation security policy developed over many years, but essentially
began in 1971 after the success of Dan Cooper's hijacking of Northwest Orient Flight
30571 , but proliferated after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 72

Cooper's inherent

hijacking success in 1971 created a need to ensure the prevention of a similar
occurrence.

Early Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), after 1971, designed to

ensure the security of airports serving scheduled air carriers were required to have
screening programs and had the responsibility to prevent and deter carriage of
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weapons and explosives aboard aircraft by potential hijackers. 73 Federal Aviation
Regulations set the overall general guidelines for all security assets and procedures
for airports within the U.S. and for U.S. and foreign airlines servicing U.S. airports. 74
Specifically, FAR Parts 107 and 108 required airport operators and airlines to issue a
security program and Part 108.7 required 100 percent screening of all passengers and
all carry-on items. 75

Also, the amount of security originally required to deter

hijacking was thought to be directly proportional to the size of the aircraft; this
approach resulted in tighter security rules for larger passenger airplanes. 76
FAR Part 121.538-mentioned above-became effective in January of
1972.

77

Due to public concern and a call for action, the amendment to Part 121-

requiring the implementation of screening systems to detect weapons and explosives
in carry-on baggage and passengers-was hastily put into effect with only three days
notice to the airlines.

78

By the end of 1972, the increasing frequency of terrorist or

criminal threats prompted the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require at a
minimum: 79
•
•
•

Screening of all persons and carry-on baggage before entering an airport's
departure area;
The availability of a sworn law enforcement officer at the screening point
within a specific period of time;
Development by both scheduled airline carriers and airport managers of
security programs approved by the FAA; and
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•

Development of an airport disaster plan.
By 1974, a call for the strengthening of United States law relating to hijacking

led to the creation of Public Law 93-366 which drastically changed the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958. 80

The international aspects of this legislation gave the

President broad statutory authority to regulate international air operations; he could
suspend foreign air commerce between the U.S. and any foreign carrier that continued
air service between itself and a nation harboring terrorists. 81

Though this broad

regulatory power given to the president could have been a positive deterrence tool, it
was more complicated and more difficult to enforce than it appeared. 82
After another terrible accident in 1988, the bombing of Pan American Flight
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, federal authorities were forced to re-examine the issue
of threat warnings. 83

Just eight days after the bombing, the Federal Aviation

Administration imposed new security measures on American airlines that fly out of
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. 84 These new regulations included X-raying or
physically examining all checked baggage and increased screening of passengers. 85
The resulting report of the President's Commission on A viati on Security and
Terrorism, published May 15, 1990, provided more than 60 recommendations for
80
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improving airport and aircraft security procedures and concluded that the United
States should pursue a more ·vigorous counterterrorism policy. 86 Recommendations
included: 87
•
•

•
•

Management of security at domestic airports by the federal
government;
Negotiations with foreign governments to permit U.S. carriers to
comply with U.S. law overseas even when they conflict with local
law;
Public notification of threats to civil aviation;
Research to improve technological means to prevent terrorism.

Once agarn, such recommendations were good, but they proved difficult to
implement.

First, the United States does not have the authority to demand that

overseas airports comply with U.S. laws; the art of diplomacy is required to ensure
compliance and some nations are more easily convinced than others. 88 Also, public
notification can cause panic. Finally, the issue of who determines whether a threat is
real and who decides what action should be taken remains unresolved. 89

The

recommendations of the President's Committee on Aviation Security and Terrorism
led to the Aviation Security Improvement Act of I 990 (ASI Act 1990).90
The ASI Act of 1990 established new offices and positions.

Within the

Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of Transportation the legislation
created a Director of Intelligence and Security, numerous federal security manager
positions authorized to implement security programs throughout the U.S., and an
86
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assistant administrator of Civil Aviation Security. 91 The Director of Intelligence and
Security was responsible for coordination with appropriate federal agencies;
development of policies and plans for dealing with threats; serving as the primary
liaison of the Secretary with intelligence and law enforcement communities; and any
and all other duties that may be necessary to ensure the security of the traveling
public.

92

The assistant administrator of Civil Aviation Security was responsible for

the day-to-day management of the FAA field security resources. 93

The 1990

legislation also authorized the positioning of federal security managers at all Category
X U.S. airports and liaison officers at designated airports outside the U.S. in order to
coordinate security on a global basis. 94

Finally, Section 105 of the legislation

mandated background checks on airport and airline personnel and Section 107
ordered a program to accelerate research and development and the rapid
implementation of new technologies and procedures. 95 Following the tragic crash of
TWA Flight 800 in July 1996, President Clinton created the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security; their report provided 20 specific
recommendations for improving security. 96 The Federal Aviation Reauthorization
Act of 1996 was signed in October 1996 and focused in part on FAA certification of
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security companies to improve the training and testing of security screeners through
uniform performance standards. 97
The Federal Aviation Administration was originally charged with the task of
ensuring that airlines were implementing the proper security procedures. The FAA' s
Civil Aviation Security (CSA) Division was tasked with keeping civil aviation safe
from terrorist attacks. 98 The office of the FAA Associate Administrator for Civil
Aviation Security developed and executed regulatory policies, programs, and
procedures to prevent terrorist, criminal, and other disruptive acts against civil
aviation. 99 However, the FAA was no longer charged with these duties after the
development of the Transportation Security Administration in response to the terrorist
hijackings of September ll th . 100

The Federal Aviation Administration's Civil

Aviation Security organization was integrated into the newly founded TSA. 101 The
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001 was signed into law by
President Bush and created the TSA within the Department of Transportation;
however, the TSA was later transferred to be a part of the Department of Homeland
Security .102 The ATSA put the federal government in charge of the monitoring and
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performance of transportation security. 103 The TSA was charged with the following
general duties: 104
•
•
•

Screen all persons, baggage, and cargo;
Provide stress management conflict resolution programs; and
Implement policies for professional interaction with passengers.

The TSA is comprised of 50,000 security officers, inspectors, directors, air marshals
and managers who protect the nation's transportation systems-roadways, rail travel,
and air travel. 105 The mission of the TSA is to "protect the Nation's transportation
systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce." 106 The TSA's
organization structure is intended to provide optimal service and respond to changing
needs. 107
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Figure 3: Transportation Security Administration Organizational Structure 108
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This chart represents the administrative staff positions within the Transportation
Security Administration. Professionals employed for the purpose of aviation security
include: Transportation Security Officers, Federal Air Marshals, Federal Flight Deck
Officers, Transportation Security Inspectors, and National Explosives Detection
Canine Teams. 109 Transportation Security Officers are located at airport checkpoints
to perform security screenings; they are the most visible to the public and represent
the largest group of employees. 11

° Federal Air Marshals serve as the primary law

enforcement entity within TSA and they work closely with other law enforcement
agencies to protect air travel. 111 Federal Flight Deck Officers are armed pilots, flight
engineers, or navigators who have been trained to use firearms to defend against an
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act of criminal violence or air piracy attempting to gain control of an aircraft. 112
Transportation Security Inspectors are dedicated to the oversight of air cargo. 113
These positions represent a multi-layered approach to securing commercial airliners
from terrorist and criminal assault. 114
The TSA uses layers of security to regulate the traveling public and the
Nation's transportation system. 115 Security checkpoints in airports represent only one
layer of security; others include intelligence gathering and analysis, checking
passenger manifests against watch lists, random canine team searches at airports,
federal air marshals, federal flight deck officers and more security measures both
visible and invisible to the public. 116 Each one of these layers alone is capable of
stopping a terrorist attack; when combined, their security value is multiplied, creating
a much stronger, formidable system. 117 According to the TSA, a terrorist who must
overcome multiple security layers in order to carry out an attack is more likely to be
pre-empted, deterred, or to fail during the attempt. 118
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Figure 4: TSA: 20 Layers of Security 119
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Each horizontal arrow represents a terrorist path and the vertical boxes represent the
layers of security measures that must be penetrated before a terrorist can successfully
execute an attack. The chart represents the difficulty presented to potential attackers
by the multiple security measures implemented by the TSA. Each layer has the
ability to prevent an attack on its own; therefore, multiple layers mean a greater
· 120
chance of prevention.
Security measures implemented by the TSA include JOO percent screening of
all cargo on single-aisle passenger aircrafts as of October 2008 and surprise cargo
119
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security inspections.

121

Screening of baggage and passengers is also on the frontline

of defense. Many of the security officers working for the TSA are now certified
Behavior Detection Officers, which are trained security officers who screen travelers
for involuntary physical and physiological reactions that people exhibit in response to
a fear of being discovered. 122 Referral of Behavior Detection Officers for further
screening is based on specific observed behaviors only, not on one's appearance, race,
ethnicity or religion.

123

BDOs add an element of unpredictability to the security

screening process; it is easy for passengers to navigate, but difficult for terrorists to
manipulate and serves as an important additional layer of security in the airport
environment requiring no additional specialized screening equipment. 124 The TSA
also uses employee screening through the use of background checks before
employment and random inspections. 125

Another security measure is the Secure

Flight program, which conducts uniform prescreening of passenger information
against federal government watch lists for domestic and international flights. 126
Despite the advances in security measures implemented by the Transportation
Security Administration, many critics believe that several weaknesses in the system
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still exist. Some critics argue that the ease in which airline and airport employees
bypass security checkpoints when entering security areas is a major flaw in current
policies.

127

However, the TSA reports that a program that started in the fall of 2008

deploys officers to inspect workers, their property, and their vehicles at any given
time in any location.

128

This employee screening program is a step toward more

secure airports and could eventually lead to full screening of all employees before
they can enter secure locations. Another criticism is that checkpoint screening is not
completely efficient due to breaches in security during GAO investigations. Kutz
reported that a 2007 GAO report stated that "GAO investigators succeeded in passing
through TSA security screening checkpoints undetected with components for several
improvised explosive devices ... concealed in carry-on luggage and on passengers." 129

In order to determine the weaknesses in the security screening systems, the TSA has
implemented on-going covert testing operations by highly trained covert testers. 130
This system is intended to act as a measure of system-wide effectiveness and drive
improvement through training. 131 The Transportation Security Administration states
that the experts performing the covert tests know the system better than anyone and
have the advantage of not being subject to TSA's 18 other layers of security
potentially making them the most difficult to detect. 132 This covert testing ensures the
continual improvement of the aviation security system. For example, some of the
127
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best practices developed as a result of covert testing; including, testing bomb kits at
every checkpoint in the nation and enhanced scrutiny of shoes and other bulky
clothing.

133

Kip Hawley, TSA Assistant Secretary, announced the success of

Behavior Detection Officers during the screening process. 134 She stated that on April
1, 2008, a Jamaica-bound passenger aroused the suspicion of BDOs, who, working in
conjunction with the Orlando Police Department, the Orange County Bomb Squad,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, uncovered everything needed to make a
bomb in the passenger's checked bag. 135 The Behavior Detection Officers, trained to
detect deceptive and suspicious behavior, are contributing to airline security by
detecting and discovering dangerous people and dangerous items. 136

Also, at

Boston's Logan International Airport, Behavior Detection Officers, using behavioral
cues, grew suspicious of a passenger who turned out to be carrying large, illegal
amounts of prescription medication and a passport belonging to another person. 137
The implementation of the Behavior Detection Officers Program is having great
success and is an asset to airport security check points. These and other similar
programs are bridging the gaps in security in the aviation industry and represent the
success of current aviation security policies.
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Aviation security policy has developed in response to criminal and terrorist
attacks of the aviation industry. Each time an attack or breach of security occurs new
policies have been created to deal with the new threats. Current aviation security
policy is the responsibility of the Transportation Security Administration located
within the Department of Homeland Security. It is their job to ensure safe passenger
and cargo travel on all flights. Though many new and effective security procedures
have been implemented it is important to note the flaws that still exist within the
system in order to enhance security in the future.
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TSA AND CBP

The Transportation Security Administration and Customs and Border Patrol
are responsible for facilitating the flow of travel and trade while protecting the U.S.
from the threat of terrorism. There are four common administrative challenges that
exist within both agencies: budget/fiscal, changing threats, structural barriers, and
politics.
Fiscal challenges come in the form of competition for funding and limitations
on spending. Agencies must compete for program funding from Congress in order to
ensure agency and program snrvival. According to "Terminating Public Programs"
written by Mark Daniels, it is difficult to terminate a public program, but it can be
accomplished if certain conditions are met. 138 To ensure survival, agencies must
ensure funding, which creates competition among and between government agencies.
When huge budget deficits and shrinkage of tax revenue exist it is financially
imperative to reduce programs where it is politically possible. 139 This type of fiscal
constraint leads to interagency conflict and resistance to cooperation since
cooperative efforts have the potential to harm individual programs, prerogatives, and
budgets.

140

Investing money into a cooperative program could potentially result in a

loss of funding for a program specific to that agency leading to insufficient
cooperation.

Further, restrictions on funding make it difficult for agencies to
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implement programs in a timely fashion. Agencies are only allowed access to a
quarter of their funds at a time in order to reduce the need for supplemental
appropriations.

141

This can limit the flexibility to implement new programs in a

timely manner, which is essential for security measures. New detection technologies
are increasingly expensive, so limits on when funding can be spent delays the
distribution of necessary resources to security agencies.

Further, conflict and

confusion with regard to the roles, missions, and authorities of counterterrorism
organizations have led to the redundant efforts across the intelligence community
have led to redundant efforts and inefficient use of limited resources. 142
The most pressing fiscal issue is the lack of a budgetary theory that has the
ability to evaluate what programs should be funded and those that should not. 143
According to V.O. Key, the basic budgeting problem is determining: "on what basis
shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?" This is
another reason that agencies must compete with one another; they basically have to
lobby for their programs by portraying them in the best possible light. This increases
the chance that the budgetary process will be political instead of economic; budgeting
decisions are made of the basis of "impressionistic judgment" and not on actual
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standards of evaluation.

144

To rectify this misfortune, Key notes that "efforts to

ascertain more precisely the relative values of public services" in determining the
allocation of funds, is necessary. 145 Laurence O'Toole notes three aspects of
intergovernmental relations:

interdependency, bargaining, and complexity. 146

Budgeting conflicts between agencies exhibit severe complexity. Many of these
conflicts could be mitigated through extensive bargaining procedures that would
allow for more efficient interdependent relationships which would serve as a step
toward reducing an administrative barrier that inhibits security procedures.
The second common administrative challenge is changing threats. The only
constant is that there is always a threat from somewhere-whether it is domestic or
foreign. Threats are constantly evolving and there is a "lag" between the time that the
threat is discovered and when the solution to the threat can be implemented.
Administrative and bureaucratic barriers place a burden on the implementation of
security policy and prevention policies. This problem of efficiency lies in the fact
that "government is different" from the private sector. 147

Government can be

separated from all other institutions through the breadth of their scope, impact, and
consideration; their public accountability; and their political character. 148 No other
institution encompasses as many groups and functions as the government and no
144
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other institution is so publicly accountable. 149 It must take into consideration multiple
groups when implementing policy with the intent to do what is best for the most
people. Government tends to be less efficient because of its public nature. 150
The "lag" in response time can also be explained by the "red tape trap" which
means that law enforcers and security personnel must work within the law while
terrorists operate outside it.

151

This exposes them to legal and bureaucratic

constraints that their criminal counterparts avoid. 152 Bureaucratic officials carry out
their "daily activities within complex institutional frameworks that must obey
constitutional law, criminal statutes, and bureaucratic regulations." 153 Though these
things limit the flexibility of bureaucratic institutions they are necessary in order to
protect citizens' political rights and civil liberties and also to hold authorities
accountable to law.

154

According to Michael Kenney, the legal and bureaucratic

constraints are important to the functioning of liberal democratic states, but they
provide an advantage to the enemy by delaying response time and increasing
transparency of criminal investigations. 155
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The third common administrative challenge is politics.
politics."

156

"Government is

"Some federal departments operate with relatively clear support from the

general public in regard to the goals of their programs and policies," however, many
do not.

157

Program implementation must be balanced with controversy and

conflicting values within society.

158

Currently, one such issue that the TSA is dealing

with is the implementation of new passenger screening technology. 159 The new "full
body scanners" are more invasive than current screening methods and critics argue
that they are a violation of privacy. 160 Despite this 78% of respondents to a Gallup
Poll stated that they would approve of the full-body scanners to improve security. 161
Even so, this raises the question as to whether the trade-off between privacy and
security can be justified as a policy choice. Another political trade-off is between the
economy and security. Customs and Border Protection is implementing new border
rules that require proof of citizenship from Canadian citizens, which was not
previously required.

162

There are fears that this will impact those areas that depend

on tourism, much of which comes from across the border. 163 Though this could have
a negative impact on the economy, to ensure greater security they are necessary since
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it is plausible that a terrorist could enter Canada due to more lenient restrictions and
then cross the border into the U.S. without any barriers. There is a constant battle
between security policy and other interests due to the restrictions frequently placed on
people and actions. It is up to the people to decide the extent of the restriction they
are willing to accept in order to ensure their own safety and the future of the nation.
The fourth common administrative challenge can be classified as structural
barriers. According to Donald Kettl, "homeland security involves so many different
agencies performing so many different functions, that drawing clear lines is difficult.
Figuring out how to make all the agencies work together is far harder." 164 Agencies
are structured organizations which operate under authority delegated from
Congress. 165 Each agency has its' own job that it is required to do, and every person
within the agency has an assigned task-bureaucracy is designed so that people do
only their assigned job and stay out of the tasks of others. 166 This instills the belief
that collaborative efforts are not beneficial, required, or even allowed. This is a
definite barrier since the "War on Terrorism" is a collaborative effort requiring the
specialties of many different agencies in order to obtain the highest level of security
possible.
Mission conflicts pose another structural barrier to cooperative and
collaborative efforts among agencies. A lack of "definitional clarity as to roles and
responsibilities in the war on terrorism, and ongoing conflicts among key
164
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counterterrorism agencies, constitute an ongoing challenge." 167 For example, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency are each focused
on different intelligence information. 168 The FBI's mission is tracking and capturing
criminals; while, the CIA is focused on tracking threats in foreign countries. The
varying views and missions of the agencies contribute to a lack of communication
and intelligence sharing between agencies. Homeland Security Specialist, Gregory F.
Treverton, stated "it's no surprise that the FBI and CIA don't cooperate. We haven't
wanted them to-until now." 169

Also, no agencies mission is solely based on

homeland security; they each have other important missions which they are
responsible for.

A perfect example is Customs and Border Patrol which is also

responsible for drug trafficking and immigration issues.
Another structural barrier is varying agency cultures, which means that each
agency is inherently different in the way it is organized and operates. 170 Already
existing cultures can "blind employees to homeland security issues and make it
difficult to incorporate homeland security into existing missions." 171 For example, let
us look at the FBI and CIA once again.

The FBI has always had the duty to

investigate crimes on American soil, and the CIA was forbidden from conducting
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operations within the U.S.

172

For this reason the FBI feels that terrorism on U.S. soil

falls within its jurisdiction and should be left alone by the CIA.
Distinct agency culture, mission conflicts, and distance have led to technology
gaps that result in a lack of interagency communication. First, all of the agencies that
need to coordinate with one another-TSA, CBP, CIA, FBI, Coast Guard-are not
. a central locat10n.
. 113
1ocated rn

They are spread out over a vast area so

communication must be expertly coordinated through phone conferences and other
technological means. Also, since each agency is different in culture it is also different
with regard to technology. There is no standard database for intelligence collection
and analysis and records are kept in many different forms. 174 To improve interagency
sharing and cooperation technology upgrades would be necessary; however, these
upgrades would require mass coordination and be extremely costly. To improve
security these changes would probably be necessary since agency personnel generally
do not have the time or means to stay in constant contact with other agencies.
Finally, the last common structural problem is the difference between
bureaucratic structure and the structure of terrorist networks.

Bureaucratic

institutions are organized in a hierarchical structure. 175 The principles of hierarchy
mean a "firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a
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supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones." 176 A rigid bureaucratic structure
can impede the ability of security and law enforcement agencies to properly protect
against threats. "Other things being equal, organizations with fewer participants,
flatter authority structures, and decentralized decision rules tend to make decisions
more rapidly than those that combine tall administrative hierarchies with centralized
decision protocols."

177

U.S. security and law enforcement agencies work in large

bureaucracies that are oppressed by multiple layers of management and cumbersome
decision protocols.

178

The TSA has more than 50,000 employees organized into

numerous positions and divisions.

The agency administrator oversees fourteen

administrative divisions and each division is run by an assistant administrator who
then oversees the different offices and units within their domain. 179
Conversely, the terrorist networks are much smaller and organizationally
flat.

180

Many terrorist and trafficking networks can be considered as "intergroup

wheel or chain networks, with different nodes that p·erform specific tasks." 181
Specific cells frequently contain less than twelve members and even large wheel
networks have fewer than a hundred people. 182

Each cell has a manager who

supervises several workers and some networks contain assistant managers and cell
managers may report to the network leader or to an intermediary; however, even the
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largest networks contain no more than three or four management layers reducing the
centralization effect.

183

Also, many cell managers have significant decision-making

authority and some more loosely coupled chain networks composed of independent
groups that coordinate their transactions in an informal manner generally containing a
single manager and a handful of subordinates. 184 This flat structure allows for faster
processing of information and decisions because information flows through fewer
channels and limits information distortion because there are fewer managers to
manipulate, misplace, or withhold information. 185 For example, a decision that could
take two to three weeks to make their way through a bureaucratic chain of command
can be made instantaneously in a network structure and disseminated to everyone in
the chain of command within a single day. 186 These structural differences that exist
between flatter network organizations and hierarchical bureaucratic organizations
create a barrier for security and law enforcement officials that greatly hinder their
ability to do their job.
Despite the administrative barriers placed on Customs and Border Protection
and the Transportation Security Administration, as well as the Department of
Homeland Security as a whole, the security and intelligence agencies have made great
strides in developing and implementing heightened security measures. It is difficult
to determine whether security procedures are effective or whether the absence of
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another major terrorist attack is nothing more than a lack of attempted attacks. To
more fully evaluate the security procedures in place for passenger and cargo
screening it would be necessary to implement frequent covert testing of the system
which can identify vulnerabilities in the system.

The TSA airport screening

checkpoints are tested regularly, but continue to fail. In 2008, a TSA tester slipped
through airport security with an artificial bomb disguised in an elastic back support
brace, which he explained away by claiming he had a bad back. 187 The article stated
that TSA screeners have a "soft spot" for passenger handicaps which could easily be
exploited by terrorists.

188

This type of testing needs to continue more frequently in

order to identify weaknesses in the system and find needed solutions. However, these
test procedures should not apply solely to passenger screening; they should be
implemented for cargo shipments as well; otherwise the screening techniques for
these items will fail to improve methods and procedures.
Field research was conducted to examine the organizational and policy issues.
A survey was developed and interviews conducted to develop qualitative data that
contributed to the comparative analysis.

However, as is often the case, further

research in the areas of intelligence and security are hindered by the lack of
information available to scholars. None-the-less, interviews were conducted with
employees of the TSA and CBP; both agencies require all interviews to be conducted
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with a Public Relations Representative. A survey instrument with ten questions was
designed and distributed via email to each agency after approval was obtained by the
Morehead State University Institutional Review Board. The information obtained
proved to be general information that is readily available and therefore provided
limited results.

Though limited, the ability of scholars to properly evaluate the

intelligence community and offer sufficient solutions to administrative and
organizational problems requires this type of structured engagement for development
of data. 189
The TSA and CBP, along with all other members of the intelligence
community, must improve intelligence collection and sharing techniques. The CBP is
currently working to become a fully integrated member of the intelligence community
by transforming their approach to border security and enforcement through the use of
advanced information, intelligence-driven planning, strategically placed tactical
infrastructure, and technology to secure airspace, maritime, and physical borders. 190
CBP' s effort to become part of the intelligence community is a significant step in this
direction; however, it is also necessary that coordination of intelligence sharing be
taken to the next level. The Office of National Intelligence (ONI) was created to help
combat this problem, but according to the WMD Report the ONI needs to implement
some needed improvements.

The Director of the ONI should implement a

management structure that coordinates and "end-to-end" collection enterprise that
189

See Appendix A for the instrument and qualitative data.
Customs and Border Protection, "CBP Strategic Plan 2009-2014," (Washington, D.C.: Customs and
Border Protection, 2009), 4.
190

46

brings together members of different intelligence agencies to work together on a
single project instead of having redundant findings and bringing together different
pieces of the puzzle. 191

191
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CONCLUSIONS

The increasing complexity of the security environment, due to changing threats,
advancing technology, and the growing interconnectedness between countries, has
created a more difficult task for homeland security agencies. The Transportation
Security Administration and Customs and Border Patrol were restructured in the
aftermath of 9/1 1 as part of the largest restructuring of the federal government. These
agencies, responsible for the efficient flow of trade and travel, have made great
strides in their transformation into anti-terrorism agencies, but deficiencies continue
to exist due to administrative issues that are much out of their control. The four
common administrative challenges that found within both agencies fall into the areas
of fiscal challenges, changing threats, structural barriers, and politics. Bureaucratic
characteristics severely limit the ability of large organizations to adapt easily to
changing threats and to quickly respond to a new security threat.

Some of the

administrative characteristics-lack of interagency communication----could be
reduced with a few major changes that focus on cooperative efforts and more
effective communication methods.
The intelligence and security community would benefit from an analysis of
the organizational structure of all agencies dealing with homeland security and
intelligence collection in order to uncover more overlapping issues and potentially
create a system for the implementation of policies that would mitigate the gaps in
security. Though many improvements have been made, the intelligence and security
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community has a significant amount of work left to do in order to secure the U.S.
from the increasing threat of terrorism around the globe.
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Appendix A

Interview Questions
1. Tell me about your job and how it has changed in the last decade.

2. What can you tell me about Explosive Trace Detection Technology? How does it
work? What is the timeline on its implementation? How accurate is the technology?
How cost effective is this technology? What is the cost to security to not use the
technology?
3. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what can you tell me about the full body
scanners?
4. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security procedures are in place for
air cargo?
5. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security weaknesses exist in the
passenger and cargo screening process?
6. What is the greatest security threat at this time?
7. What advancements have been made in the area of biometric technology?
8. What are the barriers to implementing security technology?
9. The SAFE Port Act calls for 100% of container scanning at foreign ports by the
year 2012, what is the status of this policy?
10. What issues inhibit the sharing of intelligence information?
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CBP Answers

1. Tell me about your job and how it has changed in the last decade.
No response provided.
2. What can you tell me about Explosive Trace Detection Technology? How does it
work? What is the timeline on its implementation? How accurate is the technology?
How cost effective is this technology? What is the cost to security to not use the
technology?

No response provided.
3. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what can you tell me about the full
body/ cargo scanners?

No response provided.
4. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security procedures are in place for
cargo shipped by air and sea?
No response provided.
5. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security weaknesses exist in the
passenger and cargo screening process?
No response provided.
6. What is the greatest security threat at this time?
Security threats change so frequently it is difficult to pick one as the "greatest threat".

7. What advancements have been made in the area of biometric technology?
Through the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, Congress
established an expectation that DHS would use biometrics as part of the entry process
to biometrically compare and authenticate visa or other travel or entry document
issued by DHS or the Department of State. The equipment and software that will
enable DHS to biometrically compare and authenticate these documents has been
deployed to the ports of entry since October 2005.
US-VISIT records biographic and biometric information to conduct security checks
and verify the identities of international travelers applying for admission into the
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United States. By linking a person's biometric information to his or her travel
documents reduces the risk that a traveler's identity or documents could be
intentionally misused by someone attempting to gain entry into the United States.
The US-VISIT program currently checks a visitor's fingerprints against DHS records
of immigration violators and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) records of
criminals and known or suspected terrorists. Checking biometrics against the watch
list helps officers make visa determinations and admissibility decisions. Collecting 10
fingerprints also improves fingerprint matching accuracy and the department's ability
to compare a visitor's fingerprints against latent fingerprints collected by Department
of Defense (DOD) and the FBI from known and unknown terrorists all over the
world. Additionally, visitors' fingerprints are checked against the FBI's Criminal
Master File.
8. What are the barriers to implementing security technology?
No response provided
9. The SAFE Port Act calls for 100% of container scanning at foreign ports by the
year 2012, what is the status of this policy?
CBP is committed to securing the global supply chain through a risk-management
based, layered enforcement approach, an effort that includes advance information,
sophisticated technology and partnerships with the trade community and other
countries.
Following cargo scanning deployments to several foreign seaports, CBP will focus
future scanning deployments on high-risk trade corridors, which represent the greatest
threats to the U.S. Prioritizing deployments in this way will maximize the security
benefits with the resources provided.
CBP met the legislative requirement to establish a 100% scanning pilot program in
three locations and went beyond the legislative mandate by deploying the Secure
Freight Initiative (SFI) at a total of six ports including: Port Qasim, Pakistan; Puerto
Cortes, Honduras; Southampton, United Kingdom; Modern Terminal, Hong Kong;
Gamman Terminal, Busan, Korea; and the Port of Salalah, Oman.
SFI Division is currently negotiating the deployment of scanning operations with
Hutchison Port Holdings, Karachi International Container Terminal (KICT) and
Pakistan International Container Terminal (PICT). CBP has purchased two NII
systems (SAIC P-7500) for the SFI deployments to the Port of Karachi.
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CBP is currently negotiating with the Government of Egypt to deploy scanning
operations to the Port of Alexandria. In August 2009, CBP Officials traveled to
Egypt to present the Egyptian Government with a copy of the MOU which was
translated into Arabic for their review.
The expansion of scanning operations to the Ports of Karachi, Pakistan and
Alexandria, Egypt fits within the Department of Homeland Security's strategy to
deploy SFI scanning operations to locations of strategic importance. These ports are
among the top scoring ports for risk when considering ATS scores, intelligence
reports, and USCG assessments.
CBP has met the SAFE Port Act pilot requirement. SFI is fully operational and is
currently scanning 100% of U.S. bound containers laden in:
Port Qasim (Pakistan)

- Fully operational on October 12, 2007
- Of the 86,442 containers scanned to date, 450
have alarmed (1% of total scanned)

Puerto Cortes (Honduras)

- Fully operational on October 12, 2007
- Of the 141,285 containers scanned to date,
1,115 have alarmed (1% of total scanned)

Southampton (U.K.)

- Fully operational on October 12, 2007
- Of the 24,285 containers scanned to date,
1,287 have alarmed (5% of total scanned)

10. What issues i11hibit the shari11g of i11tellige11ce illformatio11?
No response provided.
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TSA Interview Responses
1. Tell me about your job and how it has changed in the last decade.
No response provided
2. What can you tell me about Explosive Trace Detection Technology? How does it
work? What is the timeline on its implementation? How accurate is the
technology? How cost effective is this technology? What is the cost to security to
not use the technology?
TSA used explosive trace detection (ETD) technology at security checkpoints around
the country to screen carry-on baggage and to screen passengers for explosives in
secondary screening. Earlier this year, TSA is expanded the random use of ETD
technology in airports as part of our layered approach to aviation security and to keep
passengers safe. Officers may swab a piece of luggage or passenger hands and then
ETD technology to test for explosives. The swab is then placed inside the ETD unit
which analyzes the content for the presence of potential explosive residue. ETD units
cost approximately $45k each.
3. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what can you tell me about the full body
scanners?
TSA's job is to keep the traveling public safe and the use of advanced imaging
technology is critical to mitigate known and evolving threats. Since 9/11, Congress
has mandated that TSA invest in technologies to strengthen the efficiency and
security of aviation. Imaging technology is an integral part of that effort.
Imaging technologies safely screens passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats
including weapons, explosives and other objects concealed under layers of clothing
without physical contact to help TSA keep the traveling public safe. Advanced
imaging technology is optional to all passengers. Those who opt out may request
alternative screening at the checkpoint, to include a physical pat-down.
TSA plans to install 450 AIT units throughout U.S. airports during 2010 and nearly
1000 through 2011.
More information is available at
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/imaging_technology.shtm
4. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security procedures are in place for
air cargo?
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TSA is responsible for ensuring the security of all modes of transportation, including
cargo placed aboard airplanes and particularly focuses on passenger-carrying planes.
TSA worked closely with Congress for more than six months to significantly
strengthen security in air cargo through the 9/11 Bill, which was signed into law on
August 3, 2007. TSA has met the mandates of the law to date and currently 50
percent of air cargo on passenger carrying aircraft is screened. One hundred percent
of the cargo on 96 percent of the flights originating in the United States is now
screened. Eighty-five percent of the passengers flying each day from U.S. airports are
on planes where all of the cargo has been fully screened.
One step in achieving 100 percent screening is the requirement for all airlines
operating narrow body passenger aircraft from U.S. airports to screen I 00 percent of
cargo transported on them.
By working with air carriers and members of the air cargo community, we began
screening 100 percent of cargo transported on narrow-body (single-aisle) aircraft.
TSA achieved this milestone in October 2008 - a full 22 months before the deadline.
TSA already has in place a multi-layered, high-tech, industry-cooperative approach,
utilizing surprise cargo security inspections called "strikes," covert testing, security
directives and 100 percent screening at 250 smaller airports. 1n 2008, TSA eliminated
all exemptions to screening of air cargo for the first time and increased the amount of
cargo which is subject to mandatory screening.
With TSA's new air cargo regulation, TSA will be doing 100,000 more background
checks, specifically on cargo employees who screen cargo and/or have knowledge of
how it is going to be transported or actually transport the cargo. The rule requires
more robust checks and more visibility on the shipping companies and their
employees. Additionally, we have extended security areas at the airport to include air
cargo areas.

5. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security weaknesses exist in the
passenger and cargo screening process?
No response provided

6. What is the greatest security threat at this time?
No response provided

7. What advancements have been made in the area of biometric technology?
No response provided
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8. What are the barriers to implementing security technology?
No response provided

9. The SAFE Port Act calls for 100% of container scanning at foreign ports by the
year 2012, what is the status of this policy?
No response provided

10. What issues inhibit the sharing of intelligence information?
No response provided
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